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POINT i i 
THE COURT CORRECTLY LIMITED ITS REVIEW 
OF THE REZONING OF THE CHEVRON PROPERTY 
TO A DETERMINATION THAT THERE WAS A 
REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE COUNTY'S ACTION. 
The case of Navlor v. Salt Lake Citv, II 6 U. 2d 1 92, 398 
] I 9 65) iiE , i :! ' n .me ' re i is of: :h s c: I HI . a t i. • :ases, ha v € • !: = 1 • :I II 1 La 1: 
<. -< .a . "Il  "Il n ::> t :i n t e r fe re w i th zoi :i, :i i: Ig d e c i s i o n s a s ] oi ig a s 
there is a reasonable basis for the decision.1 Sandy, in its 
petition for rehearing, again argues that this standard of 
review should not be followed in this case.2 
The Court applied this standard in its review of the 
merits of the zoning decision and the findings of the Planning 
Commission for the conditional use application. Issues 
concerning the interpretation of the master plan, the impact of 
development on the area, and the need for development are 
issues which were considered by the Planning Commission and 
County Commission and the record supports the County's decision 
concerning such matters« Sandy attempts to argue that this 
standard should not have been applied because of the issues 
concerning the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418. The issues 
concerning the application of that statute to this case are 
strictly legal issues, separate from the merits of the 
zoning.3 The Court did not defer to the County on these legal 
1. Cottonwood Heights Citizens Assn. v. Board of 
Comm'rs. , 593 P.2d 138 (Ut. 1979); Marshall v. Salt Lake Citv, 
141 P.2d 704 (Ut. 1943); Crestwood-Holladay Homeowners Assn. v. 
Enqh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Ut. 1976). 
2. This issue was addressed by all parties in their 
briefs. The County Brief, Point II.A., pp. 13-18; Chevron 
Brief, Point III, pp. 24-29; Sandy Reply Brief, Point II, pp. 
14-18. 
3. Sandy continues to argue that the cost of the 
Chevron development is $760,000.00, citing its appraisal. The 
appraisal from Gary Free actually stated that the cosb of the 
Chevron development would be between $660,000.00 and 
$760,000.00 if land, site and building improvements, tenant 
finish, furnishings and equipment were all included as costs. 
Free Appraisal, p. 2. 
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B. SANDY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE ISSUES CONCERNING 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DURING THE REZONING PROCESS. 
Sandy argues in its petition that there was no "specific 
use" for the property at the time of the rezoning process and 
therefore issues concerning Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 could not 
have been addressed- It is ironic that Sandy now takes this 
position because Sandy argued in its reply brief that the 
entire development was laid out during the zoning process.4 
Issues concerning the applicability of Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 
were well known to Sandy at the time of the rezoning process 
and were raised by Sandy in its letter seeking to have the 
zoning reconsidered by the Board of County Commissioners. 
R-23. This record supports the Court's determination that 
Sandy could have raised the urban development issues during the 
zoning process. 
Sandy also claims that the County entered into an 
agreement or understanding with Sandy that legal issues 
concerning Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 would be addressed at the 
conditional use hearing. The record does not support Sandy's 
contention. The Board of County Commissioners refused to 
rehear the application for rezoning since the rezoning had 
already been approved and the ordinance enacted and published. 
It referred Sandy to the Planning Commission because the 
conditional use application for the Chevron station was pending 
before the Planning Commission at that time. This comment can 
4. "The property owner's entire development was laid 
out and presented to the County at the time that the commercial 
zoning was requested." Sandy Reply Brief, p. 12. 
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hardly be construed as an agreement between the parties as to 
where jurisdiction lay for review of issues concerning Utah 
Code Ann. 10-2-418. Envelope 5, Document 6. In any event, 
jurisdiction of a court or administrative body over a subject 
matter is not subject to a stipulation or agreement by the 
parties. State Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 
P.2d 998 (Ut. 1982); Bailev v. Sound Lab. Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 
(Ut. 1984); 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law §152; Springville 
Community District v. Iowa Dept. of Public Instruction, 109 
N.W.2d 213 (10. 1961). 
C. SANDY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THE REZONING DECISION 
REVIEWED IN COURT. 
Sandy argues that there could have been no administrative 
review of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 17-27-16 
because the rezoning of the Chevron property was a legislative 
matter.5 That is not a correct statement of Utah law. 
Although the original enactment of zoning ordinances for a 
municipality or county are legislative acts, zoning amendments 
for individual properties which implement a comprehensive plan 
and adjust it to current conditions are administrative in 
nature. Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251 (Ut. 1982); Bird v. 
Sorenson, 394 P.2d 808 (Ut. 1964). The Wilson and Bird cases 
both involved rezoning of properties from residential to 
commercial, which the Utah Supreme Court held were 
administrative acts. This case also involved rezoning of a 
5. See footnote 13 and number 6 of Point III in Sandy's 
petition for rehearing. 
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parcel from residential to commercial to adjust the 
comprehensive plan to reflect current conditions and, 
therefore, on the basis of the criteria set forth in the Wilson 
and Bird cases, this rezoning was clearly an administrative act. 
Regardless of whether Utah Code Ann. 10-9-9 is 
specifically applicable to this fact situation, Sandy clearly 
had the opportunity to have judicial review of the rezoning 
decision. A declaratory judgment action pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. 78-33-2 is an appropriate action to review rezoning 
decisions and also to seek interpretation of statutory 
provisions. Navlor v. Salt Lake City, supra; Phi Kappa Iota 
Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 212 P.2d 177 (Ut. 1949). 
Injunctive actions brought under Rule 65A of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure have been used to test the validity of zoning 
amendments. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, supra. Actions 
brought under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 
the form of certiorari may also be used to test the validity of 
zoning decisions. Sandy failed to avail itself of any of the 
above remedies to have the rezoning reviewed in court in a 
timely manner. 
POINT IV 
OTHER ALLEGATIONS BY SANDY THAT THE 
COURT OF APPEALS MADE ERRORS OF FACT AND 
LAW IN ITS OPINION ARE INCORRECT. 
The issue of whether the County properly submitted the 
administrative record to the District Court was addressed by 
-6-
all parties in their briefs7 and was addressed in detail in the 
Court's opinion. Sandy fails to mention in its petition that 
it was allowed to review the record and to submit any 
additional documents it wanted.8 Sandy makes no claim in its 
petition that the record is not complete, or that there are any 
documents in the record of which it was not aware. In fact, 
nearly all of the record was already before the District Court 
as attachments to affidavits. Sandy has added nothing to the 
arguments previously made in its brief which would merit 
reconsideration by the Court of this issue. 
Sandy concludes the petition for rehearing by stating 
that unfairness will result if it is not allowed to reargue the 
issues already decided by the Court. Sandy is wrong. The only 
unfairness that could result in this matter would be the 
hardship on defendants, especially Chevron, from another 
hearing in this matter when the issues have already been 
carefully considered and decided by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter has been thoroughly reviewed at two 
administrative levels, by the District Court, and by the Court 
of Appeals. Sandy raises nothing in its petition for rehearing 
which would justify another review of the matter. For the 
7. County Brief, Point II.B., pp. 14-15; Chevron Brief, 
Point IV.6., pp. 32-33; Sandy Brief, Point II.B., p. 26. 
8. Sandy added the McDonald's file to the record. 
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reasons stated herein, Salt Lake County asks that the Court 
deny Sandy's petition for rehearing. 
DATED this "^ day of July, 1990. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By_ feLst<t&«s^ 
KENT S. LEWIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellees Salt 
Lake County and Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission 
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